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Abstract
This paper aims at assessing cultural di¤erences in uncertainty attitude across
Europe. We select questions from the European Values Survey (EVS) captur-
ing salient features of uncertain scenarios ("safe versus uncertain", "freedom of
choice" and "reduction of uncertainty"), and formalize these questions through
simple decision-theoretic problems. We then consider three competing normative
models of choice under uncertainty (subjective expected utility (SEU), maximin
utility and minimax regret), and analyze how they behave when facing each deci-
sion problem. We obtain theoretical predictions and, using the EVS dataset, we
test them via latent class analysis to estimate the distribution of these behaviors
across EU15. We nd a larger proportion of SEU maximizers (Bayesians) in
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1 Introduction
In the decision-theoretic literature several alternative approaches have been developed
to deal with choice under uncertainty, where uncertainty refers to not knowing the
probability distribution of the underlying states of nature. We consider three di¤erent
axiomatic approaches. In the Bayesian or subjective expected utility model (Savage,
1954) uncertainty is transformed into risk by assessing a probability distribution over
the set of possible states. The maximin utility model (Wald, 1950, Milnor, 1954) is only
concerned with the worst outcome possible for each choice. Minimax regret (Savage,
1951, Milnor, 1954) captures aversion to lost opportunities.
Our aim is to assess the relative frequency of these alternative behavioral models
across citizens of all countries in EU15 when facing uncertain scenarios. To reach this
goal we identify ve questions from the European Values Survey (EVS) which capture
salient features of uncertain choice scenarios. We group these questions into three
simple choice contexts. For each context we set up an elementary decision problem,
each uncovering a specic feature of uncertainty. We then derive theoretical predic-
tions about the behavior of our three alternative choice models. We nally use the
dataset provided by the EVS and, via latent class analysis, estimate the distribution
of behavioral types across EU15.
The rst two questions we select from the EVS questionnaire capture a general
attitude towards uncertainty. They evaluate the importance for the respondents of,
respectively, job security and long-term personal relationships. We group these two
questions into one decision problem, which we label safe versus uncertain. In it a
decision maker (DM) has to choose between a safe option and an option yielding an
uncertain outcome. Job security and long-term relationships are interpreted as safe
options. The DM can avoid uncertainty by choosing the safe option at the expense of
possibly foregoing better outcomes.
The third and the fourth question selected assess preference for freedom of choice.
These questions ask how important are, respectively, the opportunity to use own ini-
tiative in a job and teaching independence to children. Attitude towards uncertainty
inuences the willingness to exert freedom of choice. The idea is that preferences for
an active or for a passive position can be inuenced by how good one thinks one is
in dealing with uncertainty. We construct a decision problem, labelled freedom of
choice, in which the DM is asked whether she wants to make the choice herself or to
leave the choice up to someone else. Choosing to use initiative as well as emphasizing
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the value of teaching independence to ones own children are associated with preference
for freedom of choice.
The last question evaluates preference for a job with not too much pressure. We
interpret pressure as the agents feeling of stressful urgency when confronting unstruc-
turedsituations. For this question we construct a decision problem, called reduction
of uncertainty, in which an agent facing an uncertain scenario has the option of invest-
ing own resources to reduce uncertainty by acquiring more information. Information
is costly but possibly reveals which state will occur. Under the hypothesis that job
pressure increases with the degree of uncertainty of the choice scenarios, preference for
a job with not too much pressure is considered as a signal that investing in reducing
uncertainty is valuable.1
By establishing a link between the questions and the choice problems we can predict
the responses of our three behavioral types to the EVS questions. In all three decision
problems we nd that choice varies across the di¤erent behavioral models. Combining
our ndings across these three problems, we identify the following behavioral patterns.
Bayesians may or may not like safe choices, like to exert their freedom of choice and give
relatively low value to reducing uncertainty (as they feel comfortable with it). Maximin
utility DMs like safe options, like freedom of choice and uncertainty reduction. Finally,
minimax regret DMs are willing to partially engage in uncertain scenarios, moderately
like freedom of choice and have a preference for reducing uncertainty.
In the empirical analysis we focus on EVS data from 1999 and consider the fteen
countries belonging to European Union at that date (EU15). We wish to classify
how many individuals provide answers that are consistent with each of the behavioral
models and to compare the resulting frequencies across Europe. To do this we perform
a latent class analysis, where a class is dened by a DM type. The three behavioral
patterns identied in the theoretical analysis guide us when imposing the constraints
necessary to dene the types. For example, if theory suggests that the maximin type
likes safe options, we impose its preference for job security and long-term relationship.
One additional unspecied (or free) type is added to allow for alternative behavior.
For each type an array of probabilities of each answer across all questions is estimated.
This estimation is done for the entire data set so that types are comparable across
countries. Goodness of t is assessed. In particular, we nd support for explaining the
data with four types, one behavioral type for each normative model together with an
1A more thorough discussion of the link between questions and decision problems is in Subsection
4.1.
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additional free type. The evidence is thus favorable to the restrictions identied in the
theoretical analysis.
Across Europe we nd around 69% of the sample population to be classied into
one of the three behavioral types identied by the theory. In particular, the proportions
of Bayesian, maximin utility and minimax regret types average around 39%, 23% and
6% respectively. The remaining 31% fall within the fourth type.
The fourth type is unconstrained, in the sense that no restriction is imposed on
its choices. The estimation of the answer probabilities across all questions gives us its
behavioral characterization. This type neither likes nor dislikes safe options, strongly
dislikes freedom of choice and does not su¤er pressure. The essentially passivenature
of this type, which prefers that choices are made by others, seems to be its most
distinctive feature.
As types are not country-specic but dened uniformly across Europe we can com-
pare frequencies across countries. Overall we nd remarkable di¤erences in the cultural
attitude towards uncertainty across European countries. Proportions of Bayesians are
typically higher than the average across both continental countries (such as Austria,
Germany and the Netherlands) and Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and
Sweden), while they are typically lower than the average in Mediterranean countries
(Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and, to some extent, in Ireland. Roughly the op-
posite pattern holds for the maximin utility type, whose fractions are generally high in
southern European countries and low in most continental and Nordic European coun-
tries. In light of the distinctive features of these two types identied above, we can
thus essentially conrm the north-southinterpretation (Hofstede, 2001), which is the
idea that individuals in southern European countries have a more conservative attitude
towards uncertainty than those in northern and continental countries. We also nd an
east-west divide in the sense that the majority of types in France, Portugal, Spain and
Belgium fall within the fourth free type. Western European countries are less clearly
captured by the predictions of our theoretical models. Finally, the proportions of min-
imax regret types are instead lower and generally more homogeneous across European
countries, albeit with a slight prevalence of these types in the north.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the rst attempt to cast a
bridge between formal decision theory and the cross-cultural psychological literature,
which is aimed at assessing essential di¤erences in cultural traits across countries. In
this respect, it can be interpreted as an empirical validation of three common norma-
tive models of choice under uncertainty. Overall we nd large evidence of behavior
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consistent with these models across Europe. We are of course aware that the questions
selected from the EVS questionnaire are not perfect for the purpose of assessing atti-
tude towards uncertainty. As a matter of fact, EVS questionnaire has not been designed
with this purpose in mind. Our ve questions are, in our view, the most suitable ques-
tions to our purpose on the EVS questionnaire for which data on EU15 are available.
With respect to experimental studies however, this approach allows us to exploit the
huge amount of information provided by the EVS dataset. We have at our disposal a
representative sample of population for each country in EU15, and a total of more than
20,000 interviews. Many other studies have used large datasets to construct measures
of uncertainty attitude. In particular, in his seminal work Hofstede (1980, 2001) has
built the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), measuring the extent to which the mem-
bers of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations(Hofstede, 2001,
p. 263). The UAI is a broad measure of the country-specic cultural attitude towards
uncertainty, built by interviewing 88000 IBM employees across more than 70 countries
from 1967 to 1973. It is based on the answers given to three questions concerning
employment stability, rule orientation and stress at work.2 These questions are closely
related to three of our ve selected questions, respectively, job security, oppurtunity
to use initiative and pressure (each belonging to a di¤erent decision problem). Our
approach is however methodologically di¤erent from Hofstedes one. Hofstede equally
weighs the answers to three questions, where answers are connected to behavior under
uncertainty via analogy, and then builds an index ranking all countries from the least
to the most uncertainty avoiding. We instead do not equally weigh the answers to
our questions, but determine their importance endogenously. More importantly, we
use decision theory to formulate predictions on the choices of di¤erent types along a
series of behavioral dimensions (safe vs. uncertain, freedom, reduction of uncertainty).
In a latent class analysis we then check whether our theoretical predictions can be
accepted, and if so, evaluate the relative proportions of the di¤erent DM types across
EU15 countries. Using EVS data collected in 1999, about thirty years after Hofstedes
2Uncertainty avoidance is only one of the four national cultural dimensions Hofstede originally
identied in his 1980 work, the others being power distance, individualism and masculinity. Hofstedes
work has inspired an enormous number of cross-cultural studies in the last thirty years. For an
overview of replication studies until 1994 see Sondergaard (1994). See also, among others, Hofstede-
Bond (1984), Barkema-Vermeulen (1997) and Merritt (2000). For an alternative theory of uncertainty
orientationand its link with Hofstedes concept of uncertainty avoidance see Sorrentino-Roney (2000)
and Shuper et Al. (2004).
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IBM data, we also nd evidence in favor of the north-south interpretation across
European countries, conrming the idea that cultural values tend to persist over time.
Finally, this work can also be related to the literature on ambiguity, where ambiguity
refers to the lack of a (single) prior over the possible states of nature or, equivalently, the
tendency not to reduce uncertainty to risk (Ellsberg, 1961, Schmeidler, 1989, Gilboa-
Schmeidler, 1989). In light of this denition, Bayesians are una¤ected by ambiguity,
as they form priors, while maximin and minimax regret behaviors perceive the choice
scenario as ambiguous as they do not form priors. Moreover, even though we lack
normative foundations for the behavior of the free type, its aversion towards freedom
of choice certainly contradicts the essential spirit of Bayesianism. We can interpret our
ndings as providing evidence in favor of DMs in northern and continental countries
perceiving a relatively less ambiguous choice environment and, hence, being more prone
to transform uncertainty into risk than DMs in southern countries.
Understanding cross-cultural di¤erences in uncertainty attitude may have impor-
tant implications. Even in economics, which has been traditionally reluctant to recog-
nize the relevance of cultural values and beliefs, growing empirical literature suggests
that culture matters in explaining economic outcomes (for a survey of this recent lit-
erature see Guiso et al., 2006). In particular, both theoretical and empirical studies
have been focusing on the relationship between cultural attitudes towards uncertainty
and crucial economic variables, such as a societys degree of innovativeness, the di¤u-
sion of the entrepreneurial spiritand economic growth (see for instance Shane 1993,
Cozzi-Giordani, 2008, Huang 2008). Needless to say, the policy implications from
cross-cultural analysis can be powerful. A better knowledge of cultural di¤erences and
of their economic consequences across countries can help the policy maker to design
more sensible policies, tailored to the special characteristics of the countries them-
selves. A simple but illuminating example on bankruptcy law is provided by Gerard
Roland (2004, p. 114): For example, in an economy where agents are very risk-
averse and display little taste for entrepreneurship, a bankruptcy law should not be
too punitive towards failed entrepreneurs, whereas bankruptcy laws should be tougher
towards debtors in an economy where agents are both very entrepreneurial and prone
to cheating to make a quick buck.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce
and compare the three alternative models of choice under uncertainty. In Section 3 we
construct the three decision problems and analyze the choices under each model. In
Section 4 we link these problems to EVS questions, formulate and test our predictions.
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In Section 5 we present and comment on the ndings.
2 Choice under Uncertainty
According to Knight (1921), uncertainty - as opposed to risk - is associated with
decision problems where no objective probability distribution over the states of the
world is given. There are several di¤erent axiomatic models of decision making under
uncertainty. We restrict our attention to the following three approaches: the subjective
expected utility criterion (Savage, 1954, Anscombe and Aumann, 1963), the maximin
utility decision rule (Wald, 1950) and the minimax regret criterion (Savage, 1951).
Subjective expected utility (SEU) theory is based on axioms that extend Von Neumann-
Morgensterns expected utility principle, originally developed for risk, to the case of
uncertainty. Accordingly, the decision maker (DM) acts as if she subjectively assesses
a probability distribution (or prior) over the states of the world, and then selects
the action that yields the highest (subjective) expected utility. Discomfort with this
approach of treating uncertainty as risk has led to a recent resurgence of alternative
theories.
The most common alternative is the maximin utility criterion. It was introduced
by Wald (1950), axiomatized by Milnor (1954) and recently by Stoye (2006), and has
received increasing attention since Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Under this criterion
the DM acts as if she expects to be punished by a malevolentNature. She fears
for any choice that the worst outcome possible under this choice will occur. Her sole
concern is therefore to defend herself by choosing the action that maximizes this worst
outcome. Randomization can be useful as the worst outcome is dened in expected
terms once outcomes have been transformed into von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.
Note that the maximin utility decision rule can be interpreted as resulting from extreme
pessimism. However, it cannot be associated to extreme risk aversion, since the degree
of risk aversion is already captured in the measurement of utilities or payo¤s.
An alternative approach that has recently attracted attention is the minimax regret
criterion (Savage, 1951), axiomatized by Milnor (1954) and also by Stoye (2006). Here
the DM does not care about the outcome per se but about lost opportunities. She is
worried about not correctly anticipating which state of the world will occur, and hence
about not making the best choice that can be made ex post. Regret measures the loss
due to not making the best choice ex post. Analogous to the maximin utility criterion,
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the DM fears that she is facing a malevolent Nature which is trying to maximize her
regret, and consequently the DM defends herself by choosing the (mixed) action that
minimizes maximal regret. Randomization is typically benecial in this defence. Note
that, while regret is dened in terms of hindsight, one should not interpret a minimax
regret DM as one who lives in the past, since she is assumed to anticipate possible
future regret when making choices. Anticipation of aversion to lost opportunities nds
support in experiments by Zeelenberg (1999).3
We will focus on these three ways to deal with uncertainty: reversion to risk, ex-
treme pessimism and aversion to lost opportunities (see Appendix A for a sketchy
introduction to their axiomatic foundations). Let us sum up the philosophy of choice
behind each of them. The Bayesian (or cool) decision maker always addresses uncer-
tain settings by forming priors and making the necessary expected utility calculations.
The maximin utility (or gloomy) DM has a highly conservative attitude towards uncer-
tainty and acts as if the worst state of nature were certain to occur, while the minimax
regret (or anxious) DM is concerned with not missing advantageous opportunities.
3 Uncovering Models of Choice under Uncertainty
For ease of exposition we now rst proceed by constructing the three decision problems,
each focusing on a particular aspect of uncertainty. In particular, we investigate the
choice between safe and uncertain, measure a preference for freedom of choice and
capture the value of reducing uncertainty. We then compare the choices of Bayesians,
maximin, and minimax regret agents when facing each of them. The selection of the
three decision settings above is driven by the need of linking each of them to some real
questions posed in the EVS. Although we do not pretend that these settings exhaust
all possible dimensions of uncertainty attitude, they point to most basic behavioral
traits, which are also considered crucial in the cross-cultural psychological literature.
In Subsection 4.1 we return to this issue by analyzing the relationship between the
decision settings and the questions selected from the EVS, and discuss the links with
cross-cultural literature.
3Minimax regret should not be confused with other forms of regret to incorporate lost opportunities
when facing risk such as Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982).
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payo¤  
safe c c
uncertain l h
Table 1: The safe vs. uncertaindecision problem.
3.1 Safe versus Uncertain
At the heart of choice under uncertainty is the question of how one trades o¤making a
safe choice against making a choice that yields an uncertain outcome. We investigate
how the evaluation of uncertainty inuences this tradeo¤. Consider the following simple
decision problem with two actions labelled safeand uncertainand two states labelled
 and  shown in Table 1, where h > c > l are payo¤s expressed in terms of utilities.
Note that this can also be interpreted as a tradeo¤ between risk and uncertainty. One
can imagine that c is the expected value of a risky outcome to be contrasted with the
choice of uncertainthat has a truly uncertain outcome. We derive the most preferred
choice for each of the three di¤erent decision makers.
The Bayesian DM assesses a subjective probability for the occurrence of each of
the two states. If the bad state for the uncertain choice, state , is su¢ ciently likely,
the Bayesian chooses the safe action. More specically, if  denotes the probability
that state  is believed to occur, then the Bayesian chooses the safe action if  >
(h  c) = (h  l) and chooses the risky if  < (h  c) = (h  l) : In particular, if  6=
(h  c) = (h  l), the Bayesian will not randomize. Typically one does not even consider
the zero-measure prior  = (h  c) = (h  l). However, even when this knife-edge case is
considered, one would not predict that the Bayesian randomizes albeit with no specic
formal reasoning.
A maximin utility DM always chooses safe. This is immediate when considering
only pure actions since c > l. It is also true, however, when one includes all mixed
actions. This point can be seen by considering the ctitious zero sum game between
the DM and the malevolent Nature, in which the objective of DM is to maximize
utility while that of Nature is to minimize it. It is well known (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1947) that the equilibrium strategy of the DM in this ctitious game
solves the maximin utility criterion. Now note that the pair (safe, ) is an equilibrium
of this zero sum game. Hence safeattains maximin utility. Here we see the pessimism
of the maximin utility criterion at work. Regardless of how large l or h; as long as
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regret  
safe 0 h  c
uncertain c  l 0
Table 2: The safe vs. uncertaindecision problem in terms of regret.
l < c, this DM always chooses safe.
To analyze the choice of the minimax regret DM we transform utility into regret
(see Table 2). The unique mixed action that attains minimax regret involves choosing
safewith probability (c  l) = (h  l) and uncertainwith probability (h  c) = (h  l).
In particular, there is always a strictly positive probability of choosing uncertain.
The minimax regret criterion trades o¤ the magnitudes of possible loss (c  l) against
possible gain (h  l). A small probability is put on safe if and only if the ratio
of possible loss to possible gain is small. The value of minimax regret is equal to
(h  c) (c  l) = (h  l). Note here the advantage of mixing, which guarantees regret
to be strictly below the maximal regret of safe, equal to (h  c), and of uncertain,
equal to (c  l) :
To summarize, the tradeo¤ of the Bayesian is embedded in the prior. While some
Bayesians will choose safe others will choose uncertain. The conservatism of the
maximin utility DM leads her to always choose safe. Fear of missing advantageous
opportunities causes the minimax regret DM neither to choose safenor uncertain
but instead to randomize between these two actions.
3.2 Freedom of Choice
We now investigate the tradeo¤ between freedom of choiceand giving the responsi-
bility for choice to others. We wish to understand how the model of choice for facing
uncertainty inuences the value of being allowed to choose in contrast with letting
someone else choose and following their instructions. The latter situation can arise
through delegation or by entering a relationship in which one no longer makes the
choice. We build our model around the following simple decision problem. There are
two actions and two states with a unique best action in each state and where di¤erent
states have di¤erent best actions. Actions are labelled A and B, states labelled  and
, and payo¤s (or utilities) shown in Table 3. We impose y > x and z > w to create
a di¤erent best action in each state and assume further x < z and w < y in order to
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payo¤  
A y w
B x z
Table 3: The decision problem faced in stage 2 when choosing freein stage 1.
payo¤  
free yz xw
y x+z w
yz xw
y x+z w
third y + (1  )x w + (1  ) z
Table 4: The decision problem faced in stage 1 by a maximin utility agent.
ensure that not all outcomes in one state are smaller than all outcomes in the other
state.
Let us embed this choice between two actions in the following larger decision prob-
lem with two stages. In the rst stage, the decision maker has to decide whether she
wishes to make the choice herself or prefers to have the choice made by a third party.
In the second stage the actual choice between A and B occurs. At the time of the
rst stage the DM believes that the third party will choose A with probability  and
B with probability 1    for some specied  2 [0; 1]. Let freedenote the choice of
the DM at stage one to retain the role of choosing an action at stage two. Let third
denote the choice at stage one to let the third party choose at stage two.
The analysis for a Bayesian DM is straightforward. Generically this DM will not
be indi¤erent between the two actions, and, as the third party randomizes, she will
strictly prefer freeand thus to retain the power to choose the action.
Consider now maximin utility. Here one has to specify how decision making takes
place in this sequential setting. A natural approach (for an axiomatization see Sinis-
calchi, 2006) is to solve via backwards induction. If the decision maker chooses free
in stage one, then she faces the decision problem in Table 3 in stage two, where she
will then choose A with probability (z   x) = (y   x+ z   w) and B otherwise, to then
guarantee a minimal utility of (yz   xw) = (y   x+ z   w) : Notice that the choice of
this mixed action yields the same expected utility in both states. Anticipating the
outcome obtained in stage 2 when choosing freein stage 1, yields the reduced deci-
sion problem in stage 1 shown in Table 4. It then follows easily along the same line
of argument as in the safe versus uncertainmodel that this decision maker chooses
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payo¤  
free (y x)y+(z w)x
z w+y x
(y x)w+(z w)z
z w+y x
third y + (1  )x w + (1  ) z
Table 5: The decision problem faced in stage 1 by a minimax regret agent.
free.
Consider now the minimax regret DM. Looking again rst at the decision in stage
2 after having chosen freein stage 1, we nd that the DM chooses A with probability
(y   x) = (y   x+ z   w). Anticipating this choice in stage 2, we obtain the reduced
form for stage 1 shown in Table 5. For whichever value of  in [0; 1] we nd that the
minimax regret DM will mix between freeand third.
To sum up, both a Bayesian DM and a maximin utility DM have a preference for
exerting their freedom of choice, while a minimax regret DM, in randomizing across
the two choice options, exhibits a weaker preference towards freedom of choice.
3.3 Reduction of Uncertainty
We now construct a simple decision problem under uncertainty where the DM is given
the possibility of reducing this uncertainty by gathering costly information. We build
on the decision problem with two actions and two states presented in the previous
subsection. To simplify notation we normalize payo¤s so that x = 0 and y = 1, which
can be done without loss of generality. We add the restriction that w < 1 and z > 0
in order to rule out that all outcomes in one state are larger than all outcomes in
the other state. We add the possibility to learn more about the true state as follows.
By incurring a cost c the DM learns the true state with probability  and does not
learn anything new with probability 1  , where c > 0 and  2 (0; 1) are given. The
strategy of the DM who decides not to purchase information and to choose action C
(for C = A;B) is denoted by Cn: The strategy to buy information, to choose the
best action whenever the true state is revealed and to choose action C when no new
information is revealed is denoted by Cb: Payo¤s of the enlarged decision problem are
given in Table 6.
Consider a Bayesian decision maker who puts prior probability  on state  occur-
ring. Note that she prefers An to Bn if and only if she prefers Ab to Bb: This is because
the advantage of choosing Ab over Bb is only materialized in the event that nothing new
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payo¤ state  state 
An 1 w
Bn 0 z
Ab 1  c z + (1  )w   c
Bb    c z   c
Table 6: Payo¤s of the enlarged decision problem in which the DM can acquire at cost
c a probability  of learning the true state.
is learned (which occurs with probability 1 ). Conditional on this event, the payo¤s
are the same as those for An and Bn: Let 0 be the probability on state  occuring
under which the Bayesian DM is indi¤erent between An and Bn and hence indi¤erent
between Ab and Bb: So 0 = (z   w) = (1 + z   w). When  is very large, there is no
need to purchase information: one simply can choose An: As  decreases from such a
high level, the incentives to buy information (and to choose A if no new information is
revealed), as expressed by minimal cost that leads to purchase of information, increase.
This is true while  > 0: Similarly, the incentives to buy information increase in 
while  < 0: When  = 0 then Bayesian DM is indi¤erent between An and Bn and
between Ab and Bb, and hence she has the highest willingness to pay for information.
Consider  = 0: We nd that the expected payo¤ to not buying information is equal
to
z
1 + z   w;
while the payo¤ to buying information is equal to
z +  (z   w)  c (1 + z   w)
1 + z   w :
It follows that the Bayesian will buy information when  = 0 if c <  (z   w) = (1 + z   w).
Thus, for any prior  on state ; there exists c0 () such that the Bayesian DM will
buy information if c < c0 () and she will not buy information if c > c0 () where
c0 ()   (z   w)
1 + z   w:
In fact it is easily shown that c0 () is strictly below this threshold whenever  6= 0,
where c0 () can be arbitrarily small if  is either su¢ ciently large or su¢ ciently small.
Let us now turn to a maximin utility DM. Assume that this DM decides not to buy
information. Since w < 1 and z > 0 it follows that the DM will mix between An and
13
states
regret  
An 0 z   w
Bn 1 0
Ab c (1  ) (z   w) + c
Bb 1 + c   c
Table 7: Regret associated to the decision problem shown in Table 6 regarding costly
information acquisition.
Bn in the same way she would mix between A and B in the original decision problem.
Both An and Bn will maximize expected payo¤s given the mixed action of malevolent
Nature. Nature will then choose state  with probability 0, as only then will the DM
be indi¤erent between An and Bn. Given this strategy of Nature, we determined above
thatAn andBn are only best responses if and only if c   (z   w) = (1 + z   w) : Thus,
the maximin utility DM will buy information if
c <
 (z   w)
1 + z   w;
and will not buy information if instead the above expression holds with >.
Finally consider the minimax regret DM. In Table 7 we have transformed utility
into regret.
We argue analogously to the case of maximin utility. If the minimax regret DM
does not buy information, then she mixes between An and Bn: Note that Nature again
ensures that she will do so by assigning probability 0 to state . Thus we conclude,
as in the case of maximin utility, that the minimax regret DM buys information if
c <
 (z   w)
1 + z   w;
and will not buy information if instead the above holds with >.
To summarize, the Bayesian is always less willing to reduce uncertainty by buying
information than either the maximin utility or the minimax regret type, where the
latter two have the same threshold on costs below which they start buying information.
The prior of the Bayesian makes her more condent about the situation and hence less
willing to pay for more information.
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3.4 Summary
Combining the di¤erent attitudes across these three decision problems we identify the
following behavioral patterns. Bayesians may or may not like safe choices, enjoy being
unconstrained in their choices and give relatively low value to reducing uncertainty.
Maximin DMs like safe options, like freedom and value uncertainty reduction highly.
Finally, minimax regret DMs are willing to partially engage in uncertain scenarios,
moderately like freedom and give high value to reducing uncertainty.
4 Estimating Models of Choice under Uncertainty
We now use our models, and their predictions across the three choice problems devel-
oped above, to investigate the di¤erent ways in which Europeans deal with uncertainty.
The data we use is based on answers to ve questions posed in the European Values
Survey (EVS). The hypothesis is that there are at least three behavioral types, the
Bayesian, the maximin utility DM and the minimax regret DM. We rst proceed by
establishing a link between the ve questions in the survey and the decision problems
of the previous section, which allows us to predict the answers of each of the three DM
types across these questions. This link is then brought to the data using a latent class
analysis by which the proportions of each type are estimated.
4.1 Linking Choice Problems to Questions
Among the ve questions from the European Values Survey (EVS), two are associated
with the safe vs. uncertainmodel, two to the freedom of choicemodel, and one to
the reduction of uncertaintymodel. For clarity, only summaries of the questions are
presented here. We have included all details in Appendix B.
The safe vs. uncertainmodel has been constructed to represent two questions,
where the conict between safe and uncertain seems prominent. The rst question,
coded C013 in the EVS, is taken from the questionnaires section devoted to work.
It asks: Would you mention job securityas an important aspect in a job?. The
possible answers are mentionand not mention. We identify job security as the safe
option. Mentioning job security can be directly interpreted as not wanting to lose
ones job, which reveals a preference for certain outcomes. Not mentioning job security
implies a preference for (or a lower aversion towards) uncertain outcomes. A question
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on job security is also commonly used in the cross-country psychological literature (as
of Hofstede, 1980) to disentangle cultural attitudes towards uncertainty. In light of the
analysis of the safe versus uncertainmodel, we predict how each of the three types
will answer this question. Some Bayesians will mention job security while others will
not. Maximin DMs will always mention job security. Minimax regret DMs will always
hedge against uncertainty by randomizing, so some will mention and some will not
mention job security. However, since we cannot observe this randomization we obtain
the same prediction for minimax regret DMs as we have for Bayesians. Not all will
answer mentionbut not all will answer not mention.
The second question associated with the conict between safe and uncertain, coded
D026 in the EVS, is selected from the group of questions devoted to family. It reads:
A marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy. We group the
possible answers into agree, not agree(see Appendix B for details). As is well known
to psychologists, uncertainty averse individuals tend to evade ambiguity and look for
structurenot only in their business but also in home life and personal relationships.
Paralleling the explanation given for the previous question, we then identify a long-
term stable relationship as the safe option, and preference for it as implicitly revealing a
relatively higher degree of hostility towards uncertain outcomes. Bayesians may agree
or disagree with the statement, maximin utility DMs always agree, while minimax
regret DMs randomize across the answer options and, hence, are associated to the
same prediction as that for Bayesians.
Freedom of choice is addressed in two questions, respectively selected from the
worksection of the questionnaire and from the one devoted to perceptions of life.
The former, coded C016, asks: Would you mention the opportunity to use your own
initiativeas an important aspect in a job?. The possible answers to this question
are mentionand not mention. Needless to say, mentioning the opportunity to use
ones own initiative is interpreted in our model as preference for freedom of choice.
This question is similar to one which is commonly used in the cross-cultural literature,
namely, the rule orientationquestion in Hofstede (1980) and subsequent studies. Fol-
lowing our three choice models, we predict that both Bayesians and maximin utility
DMs like freedom of choice and hence will choose mention, while for minimax regret
DMs some will choose mentionand others will choose not mention.
The other question in the survey capturing a taste for freedom of choice is the one
coded A029 and asking: Would you mention independenceas an especially important
quality that children should be encouraged to learn at home?. The possible answers
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are mentionand not mention. The link with our choice problem is more indirect
than in the case of question C016. While in our choice problem the DM is directly
asked to choose whether or not to exert her freedom of choice, here the interviewee is
asked to state whether or not that freedom is worth teaching to children. However,
given that one of the salient features of cultural values is that they are transmitted
from one generation to the next, individuals who are more oriented towards freedom of
choice, will be more likely to consider it worth teaching to their chidren. This question
is then most relevant, in our opinion, to disentagle individualspreference for freedom
of choice. Once again, given our three choice models, we predict that both Bayesians
and maximin utility DMs will answer mention, while for minimax regret DMs some
will choose mentionand others will choose not mention.
Finally consider the following question, selected from the work section of the
questionnaire and coded C012: Would you mention not too much pressureas an
important aspect in a job?. The possible answers are mentionand not mention.
Even this question is very similar to the one on stress in the workplacewhich is
commonly used in the cross-cultural literature (again see Hofstede (1980, 2001) and
related studies). The link with our reduction of uncertaintymodel is provided by
the following argument. Both pressure and stress are closely related to the feeling of
anxiety, which is a di¤use state of being uneasy or worried about what may happen
(Hofstede (1994), p. 170). If we interpret pressure as the feeling of stressful urgency
associated with unfamiliar, unknown choice scenarios, then a worker, who feels under
pressure, will be more willing to invest resources to reduce the uncertainty of her choice
scenario. In other words, the stronger the feeling of pressure, the higher the workers
willingness to pay to obtain a clearer picture of her choice setting.4 We then predict
that a Bayesian, who feels relatively comfortable in situations of uncertainty, does not
feel much pressure and is likely to choose not mention. Both a maximin utility DM
4Notice that in our model the DM can reduce uncertainty only by participating in a risky bet.
The DM pays a (certain) cost c to acquire a probability  of resolving uncertainty. This is not a
contraddiction to the extent that risk and uncertainty are two distinct concepts (Kinght, 1921), and
is perfectly in line with the standard interpretation of uncertainty avoidance across psychological
literature. In the words of Hofstede (1994, p. 172) Rather than leading to reducing risk, uncertainty
avoidance leads to a reduction of ambiguity. Uncertainty avoiding cultures shun ambiguous situations.
People in such cultures look for a structure in their organizations, institutions, and relationships that
makes events clearly interpretable and predictable. Paradoxically, they are often prepared to engage
in risky behavior in order to reduce ambiguities (italics added), like starting a ght with a potential
opponent rather than sitting back and waiting.
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Group Question Content Bayesian Maximin M. regret
safe C013 Job security some mention, some not mention randomize
safe D026 Long-term relationship some agree, some not agree randomize
free C016 Initiative mention mention randomize
free A029 Independence mention mention randomize
unc. red. C012 No pressure not mention mention mention
Table 8: Theoretical predictions
and a minimax regret DM give higher value to reducing uncertainty, so we predict that
they feel more pressure and are likely to choose mention.
Table 8 summarizes the predicted answers from our three decision types across the
ve questions.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
We now wish to estimate how many individuals behave consistently with each of our
behavioral models.
4.2.1 Selecting the Method
We need to select a method for estimating the existence of such underlying behavioral
models in the EVS data. Flexibility of the method is desired as we do not expect the
vast majority to behave entirely according to one of the three models. Our models are
normative, and many di¤erent concerns come into play when interpreting a question
and selecting an answer. We are happy to be able to explain regularities and tendencies.
Thus we wish to choose a method that allows di¤erent questions to be assigned di¤erent
degrees of importance in explaining regularities. Our behavioral models should be able
to compete with alternative systematic ways of responding to the questions. At the
same time, we need to be able to correct for the fact that a less restrictive denition
of a type will always explain the data more accurately. We choose to perform a latent
class analysis, in that it gives us the desired exibility and the means to investigate
the role of degrees of freedom in explaining the data.
Previous investigations on cross-cultural attitudes towards uncertainty (Hofstede
(1980) and subsequent studies) have given equal weight to each question included in
the analysis. The questions asked in surveys, however, are just approximations of
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the question we are really interested in (Do you mind ambiguity?or What is your
type?). To ignore that some questions are better approximations than others is to
ignore that the explanatory power of the questions may vary. For example, consider
the extreme case that one of the included questions has no explanatory power. By
just counting the correct answers, this irrelevant question has the same impact as the
other questions. Our method instead does not impose equal explanatory power of the
questions but determines their relevance endogenously.
Latent class analysis is a method to nd classes (or clusters) in the data when the
relative importance of the questions is not known.5 In our model a class represents a
DM type. In addition to our three types we add an unrestricted (or free) type in order
to pick up regularities not predicted by our models. Individuals belonging to a given
type are assumed to answer any given question according to a probability distribution
that only depends on the type and on the question. The proportions of types, as well as
the probability distributions over the answers for each question and type, are estimated
by maximizing the likelihood of the data. The estimated behavior within a class (or
associated with a type) is then a distribution of answers to each question. Allowing for
probabilitistic distributions over the set of answers introduces the desired exibility to
be able to capture the importance of each question for each type. Flexibility is limited
by the bounds imposed by the prediction we make for the given type. For instance,
when the type imposes that one of two answers is more likely than the other and one
estimates that the two probabilities coincide, then we nd that this question plays no
special role in explaining responses.
We seek to compare attitudes towards uncertainty across Europe. To this end we
pool the data across all countries and estimate behavior of each type, as well as the
proportions across Europe. Using the country-specic information we then derive the
induced distribution of types for each country. A separate analysis for each country
would not be useful for this objective, as estimated types identied with a probability
distribution for each question would then be di¢ cult to compare across countries.
4.2.2 Details of the Method
In the following we briey describe latent class analysis assuming, rst of all, that data
comes from a single country. Let K denote the set of DM types. Denote the sample
5Lazarsfeld (1950), Goodman (1974) and Haberman (1979) are the classic references. See Hage-
naars and McCutcheon (2002) for an overview of recent innovations.
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proportion of type k 2 K by k. Of course, k 2 [0; 1] and
P
k2K k = 1.
Let Q be the set of questions. For question q 2 Q, let Aq denote the set of pos-
sible answers. We assume that, conditional on the type of individual, the answers
across questions are uncorrelated. Let the probability that a k-type individual an-
swers question q with answer a 2 Aq be denoted by kq(a) where kq(a) 2 [0; 1] andP
a2Aq kq(a) = 1.
Let  be the parameter vector containing the sample proportions k for k 2 K and
the probabilities of the answers kq(a) for k 2 K, q 2 Q and a 2 Aq.
Up to this point a type is simply an index. However, each type is typically associated
to an exogenously imposed set of restrictions, which determine for each question a set
of possible answers or distributions over answers. The restrictions we impose for our
three behavioral types are specied in the next section. Let  be the set containing
the allowed parameter vectors  that are compatible with the exogenously imposed
restrictions on the types.
Denote the set of individuals by I. Let the answer of individual i to question q be
denoted by aiq 2 Aq. The loglikelihood of the sample faiqgi2I;q2Q of answers for each
individual across all individuals is then given by
L() =
X
i2I
log
X
k2K
k
Y
q2Q
kq(aiq)

:
The maximum likelihood estimator is then simply argmax2 L().
When the sample consists of all countries, a correction is needed to preserve rep-
resentation due to the di¤erent country sizes. Ideally one would like to have a sample
that consists of the same proportion of individuals relative to the total population in
each country. In order not to throw away observations, one considers averages when
too many individuals have been sampled. The adjustment is as follows. Denote the set
of countries by C. For country c 2 C, let the set of individuals be denoted by Ic, the
number of individuals in the sample by nc and the number of inhabitants from which
the sample was (potentially) drawn by pc. Let r = minc2C nc=pc be the minimum ratio
of individuals per inhabitant. It then follows that rpc  nc for all c 2 C. We now act
as if the proportion r was selected from each country, rescaling the above likelihood by
rpc=n. With this correction term the loglikelihood becomes
L() =
X
c2C
rpc
nc
X
i2Ic
log
X
k2K
k
Y
q2Q
kq(aiq)

:
All test statistics are corrected for the population size likewise.
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4.2.3 Imposing the Types
We have developed predictions for the behavior of each of the three models in dealing
with uncertainty (see Table 8). In the following we show how these predictions enter
the empirical model to be estimated.
If an individual is of a particular type, we expect her to answer the questions in
line with that type. However, the vast majority of individuals will not answer the
questions in a way that exactly coincides with one of the DM types. As we said above,
our estimation method assumes that a DM type has a probability distribution over the
answers of each question. If an individual is of a particular type, we thus expect that
she answers the questions in line with that type with a high probability. In other words
we predict the answer of the majority.
We now derive the restrictions imposed on the answer frequencies for each of the
three behavioral types. Consider rst the case where our model reveals a unique
prediction. For example a maximin utility DM is predicted to answer mentionto the
job security question. To allow exibility, so that di¤erent questions can have di¤erent
degrees of predictive power, we contrast our predictions to a hypothetical random DM
who is equally likely to choose all answers. So the random DM chooses mention(M)
and not mention(NM) with the same probability. The maximin utility DM should
then outperform the random DM and answer mentionwith a probability of at least
1/2. In other words, we predict that there are more maximin utility DMs answering
mentionthan not mention. We also have to specify how we deal with ambiguous
predictions, for instance with Bayesiansattitude towards job security. We want to
rule out that our estimation allows for all Bayesians in Europe to like job security or
for all to dislike job security. Hence, we impose heterogeneity by requiring that the
proportion of Bayesians liking job security lies between 25% and 75%: In this fashion
we translate each of our theoretical predictions (see Table 8) into restrictions on the
parameter set  shown in Table 9 (where A stands for agree).
5 The Findings
We now show the results of the maximum likelihood estimation on the pooled data
of the EU15 countries. We have estimated both the unconstrainedmodel, that is,
the model only made up of free types, and the constrainedmodel, that is, the model
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Question Content Bayesian Maximin M. regret
C013 job security 1
4
 (M)  3
4
(M)  1
2
1
4
 (M)  3
4
D026 long-term relation 1
4
 (A)  3
4
(A)  1
2
1
4
 (A)  3
4
C016 initiative (M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
1
4
 (M)  3
4
A029 independence (M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
1
4
 (M)  3
4
C012 no pressure (M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
(M)  1
2
Table 9: Conditions to be imposed on types
obtained by imposing the conditions on the types specied in Table 9. Moreover,
assuming that Bayesians (B), maximin utility (M) or minimax regret (R) are the only
DM types in Europe might be too strong. We therefore also perform the estimation of
the constrained model with one free type (F). The model with four free types is also
estimated.
Models statistics are summarized in Table 10, where C() and U() respectively
denote the constrained and the unconstrained models, while 3; 4 stand for the number
of types included in the estimation.
Statistic Model
C(3) C(4) U(3) U(4)
Akaike 58:0  12:2  10:1  9:1
Bayesian  53:2  97:2  101:6  61:4
Pearson 93:6 13:8 17:7 6:9
Likelihood Ratio 92:0 13:8 17:9 6:9
(0:95) 27:6 22:4 23:7 15:5
df 17 13 14 8
Table 10: The statistics for the constrained and unconstrained models with three and
four types. In addition, the table shows the 95% critical values and the degrees of
freedom.
For the unconstrained model, with both three and four types, the test statistics are
within the 95% condence range, suggesting that the model performs fairly well in ex-
plaining the data. The constrained model with only three types has instead rather high
Pearson and Likelihood Ratio values, which are known to be conservative measures for
large samples, and is acceptable only under the Bayesian criterion, which favors small
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models in terms of parameters. However, by adding one free type, the constrained
model ts the data accurately according to each of the four criteria. Moreover, the
Akaike criterion actually prefers the constrained model with four types to the uncon-
strained models with either three or four types, while for the Bayesian criterion this
constrained model performs better than the unconstrained model with four types and
only slightly worse than the unconstrained model with three types. Overall we nd
that the data can be explained by imposing the behavioral conditions on the types
dictated by our normative models.
We will now focus on the constrained model with four types. Let us proceed with
the analysis of the parameters estimated. The rst row of Table 11 reports the types
of decision makers included in the estimation, the last row contains their sample pro-
portions for all of Europe. We nd that 69% of the answers can be explained by one
of our three models, the majority, equal to 39%, falling within the Bayesian model.
Maximin utility and minimax regret types account for 23% and 6% respectively. The
rest of the sample, 31%, is captured by the free type.
Answers M/A in % Bayesian Maximin U. M. regret Fourth Avg
Job security 59 98 25 58 62
Long-term relation 49 61 25 67 53
Initiative 50 79 48 26 51
Independence 76 50 57 16 51
No pressure 13 87 50 10 32
Proportion 39 23 6 31
Table 11: The estimation results for the constrained model with four decision maker
types. For each decision maker type the table shows its population proportion and the
percentage probabilities of answer agree(A) to the question on long-term relation
and of answer mention(M) to the other four questions.
The other rows of the same table show the answer percentage probabilities of the
four types for each question. In particular, the row associated with question on long-
term relationship reports the probability for each type of answering agree(A), while
the other rows report the probabilities for each type of answering mention (M) to
the other four questions. Needless to say, subtracting these numbers from 100 gives us
the percentage probabilities of answering respectively not agreeand not mentionfor
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each type. Asterisks are added to indicate that the constraints are binding. It is worth
comparing the probabilities in Table 11 with the answer frequencies for the whole
sample reported in the nal column of the same table, which can be interpreted as
describing the averagetype. For instance, consider the question about preference for
not too much pressureat work. Around 32% of the sample do mention not too much
pressureas an important aspect in a job (that is, answer M), while the remaining
68% do not mention it. We obtain rather extreme and opposite predictions about
the behavior of Bayesian and the free type on the one hand, and the behavior of the
maximin utility type on the other. The estimated value for the minimax regret type is
instead binding at the boundary imposed by predicting that this type chooses M with
probability greater than or equal to 50%:Overall, allowing for di¤erent behavioral types
gives us the possibility of capturing the behavioral heterogeneity behind the answers to
this question. Roughly, the same reasoning holds for the other four questions, for which
our types perform reasonably well in uncovering the heterogeneity in the answers. At
the same time our types impose limits to this heterogeneity and the constraints are
binding in 1=3 of the cases with most constraints binding for the minimax regret type.
As mentioned above, latent class analysis allows us to give di¤erent weights to
di¤erent questions. For instance, while we include the questions on job security and on
long-term relationship both within the safe versus risky model, we allow for di¤erent
degrees in which the value of safe options inuences the answers to these questions.
For the maximin utility type we nd a very close alignment between mentioning job
security and the value of safe options as indicated by the value of 98%. On the other
hand, long-term relationship and safety seem to be less aligned, given our estimated
61% of choosing M:
Consider the degree to which our estimates correspond to our predictions. Looking
at the number of binding constraints we see that the Bayesian and maximin type
predict fairly well across questions, each with one binding constraint, respectively on
initiativeand independencequestions. Minimax regret behavior only predicts well
for the questions within the freedom of choicecategory. Finally Table 11 also allows
us to delineate the behavioral traits of the free or fourth type. This type neither likes
nor dislikes safe options, dislikes freedom of choice and does not mind pressure and
thus, in our interpretation, places a relatively low importance on reducing uncertainty.
Table 12 reports the sample proportions of the decision maker types for each country
in EU15. The table can also be interpreted as providing the average relative proba-
bilities that an individual belongs to each of the decision maker types. In Figures 1
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and 2 we plot the frequencies of, respectively, the maximin utility types against the
Bayesians, and the free against minimax regret types.
Country Type
B M R F
Austria 54:0 15:4 4:9 25:7
Belgium 36:9 17:7 8:5 37:0
Denmark 61:9 10:6 7:9 19:6
Finland 44:7 22:4 7:8 25:0
France 35:8 9:2 5:7 49:3
Germany 53:1 18:8 4:5 23:5
Greece 32:3 37:4 5:4 24:8
Ireland 34:9 34:0 7:4 23:6
Italy 25:2 45:7 6:0 23:1
Luxemburg 38:6 23:3 7:0 31:1
Netherlands 44:9 13:6 16:9 24:7
Portugal 27:7 20:4 4:8 47:1
Spain 27:4 29:4 5:4 37:8
Sweden 47:1 20:7 10:1 22:2
United Kingdom 41:7 20:3 7:6 30:4
EU15 39:3 23:2 6:4 31:1
Table 12: The sample proportions of the decision maker types for the constrained model
with four decision maker types. The table shows the average relative probabilities that
an individual belongs to each of the decision maker types.
While Bayesians average 39:3% of the entire sample, their proportions range from
a minimum of 25:2% in Italy to a maximum of 61:9% in Denmark. The pattern
followed by their proportions across European countries is evident. Southern European
countries, namely Greece (32%), Italy (25:2%), Portugal (27:7%) and Spain (27:4%),
are all clearly below the average. Most continental countries, namely Austria (54%),
Germany (53:1%) and the Netherlands (44:9%), as well as all Scandinavian countries,
namely Denmark (61:9%), Finland (44:7%) and Sweden (47:1%) are instead all clearly
above the average. The group of countries aroundthe average is composed of Belgium
(36:9%), France (35:8%), Luxembourg (38:6%), as well as Ireland (34:9%) and the UK
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(41:7%).
Even if less clear-cut and with lower heterogeneity, a similar and reverse pattern
emerges when looking at the proportions of maximin utility types. The average pro-
portion is 23:2%, ranging from a minimum of 9:2% in France to a maximum of 45:7%
in Italy. A group of southern countries, composed of Greece (32:3%), Italy (45:7%)
and Spain (29:4%), plus Ireland (34%), stand clearly above the average. A fraction
of continental/nordic countries, specically Austria (15:4%), Belgium (17:7%), France
(9:2%), Germany (18:8%), the Netherlands (13:6%) and Denmark (10:6%), present in-
stead relatively low proportions of maximin utility types. Around the average we nd
an admittedly rather heterogenous group of countries composed of Portugal (20:4%),
Luxembourg (23:3%), Finland (22:4%), Sweden (20:7%) and the UK (20:3%).
From these estimates a clear and remarkable di¤erence in the attitude towards
uncertainty seems to emerge between southern European countries (plus Ireland to
some extent) and continental/northern European countries. Relatively low propor-
tions of Bayesians and high proportions of maximin utility types usually characterize
the former group, while exactly the opposite pattern holds for the latter. Given our
denitions of the two types, the former group is then populated with agents holding a
relatively stronger preference for safe options and a greater aversion towards the feel-
ing of pressure. In contrast, the latter group is characterized by agents more prone to
face uncertain scenarios and less sensitive to situations of great pressure. This result,
whose graphical intuition is provided in Figure 1, is consistent with the north-south
interpretation common in the cross-country psychological literature.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The percentage of minimax regret types is around 6:4% across the whole European
sample. The countries with respectively the lowest and highest estimated proportions
of minimax regret types are Austria (4:9%) and the Netherlands (16:9%). We nd
some evidence supporting a weak northern patternfor minimax regret types, as the
highest proportions are located among northern countries. However, apart from the
Netherlands and Sweden (10:1%), the estimated proportions are mostly concentrated
near the average. We in fact nd all countries except for the latter two in the range
between 4:9% and 7:9%, suggesting that the behavioral pattern corresponding to the
minimax regret type is not widespread and is rather homogenous across Europe.
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Finally the free type averages 31:1% of the sample and ranges from a minimum of
19:6% in Denmark to a maximum of 49:3% in France. We nd a remarkable east-west
divide (see Figure 2). The highest values are taken by countries in the west, namely
France, Portugal (47:1%), Spain (37:8%), Belgium (37%), Luxembourg (31:1%) and
United Kingdom (30:4%). In fact, the fourth type captures majority behavior in the
rst four countries listed.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The relatively high frequency of the free type behavior suggests that, rather pre-
dictably, the three normative choice models do not exhaust all possible behaviors under
uncertainty observed across European countries. In particular, what these choice mod-
els seem not totally able to capture is aversion towards freedom of choice. While
a non-negligible fraction of European citizens strongly dislike freedom of choice and
seem to reason in accord with the Dutch proverb saying he who has choice has trou-
ble, none of our choice models predicts this kind of behavior, which is in fact mainly
captured by the free, atheoretical, type. We are tempted to suppose that emotionally
driven preferences, such as dislike for freedom of choice, are di¢ cult to reconcile with
the rational decision maker of standard decision theory.
It may be worthwhile to interpret the results of our empirical analysis in light
of the expanding literature on ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961, Schmeidler, 1989, Gilboa-
Schmeidler, 1989). Ambiguity is associated with the way the decision maker confronts
an uncertain environment and, in particular, with the lack of prior over the states
of nature. Bayesians behave as if they formed priors to transform uncertainty into
risk and, hence, deal with an unambiguous scenario. On the other hand, maximin
and minimax regret types behave as if they did not have any prior and thus perceive
the choice scenario as ambiguous. Moreover, since the distinctive feature of the free
type seems to be its aversion towards freedom of choice, it can be classied among
the non-prior-friendlydecision makers to the extent that a natural implication of the
prior-based approach is a positive taste for freedom of choice (see Subsection 3.2).
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that, in individual decision making under
uncertainty, ambiguity plays a prominent role across European countries, and the more
so the more we move to the south of Europe.
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A Axiomatic Foundations of Choice under Uncer-
tainty
Both the maximin utility criterion and the minimax regret criterion have been given
behavioral interpretations. However their foundations are purely axiomatic. In par-
ticular, the application of minimax regret does not depend on whether or not there is
information ex post about which state occurred. Both criteria should be seen in light of
their axiomatic foundations. The key departure from subjective expected utility (SEU)
is founded in the Symmetry Axiom. SEU allows via the prior for di¤erent states to
be treated di¤erently. The Symmetry Axiom rules out this possibility as it postulates
that choice may not depend on labels. The underlying idea is that the denition of
the decision problem must include all relevant aspects. If the decision maker never-
theless would like to make a choice that is not invariant to the relabelling of states
and actions, then this would contradict the postulate that the denition of the deci-
sion problem captures all relevant aspects. Both the maximin utility criterion and the
minimax regret criterion satisfy the Symmetry Axiom together with an additional con-
vexity axiom which is associated to ambiguity aversion. According to the latter, when
indi¤erent between two actions, the DM prefers to randomize between them in order
to better protect against uncertainty. The maximin utility criterion and the minimax
regret criterion di¤er in terms of which axioms of SEU are relaxed. Recall that Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) postulates that preferences are not allowed
to change if new actions are added. This should not be confused with the Indepen-
dence Axiom that is used to enable rearranging mathematical terms and is associated
to time consistent choice. The maximin utility decision rule satises IIA but only a
weaker version of the Independence Axiom. The added thrust of the Symmetry Axiom
together with ambiguity aversion embedded in the convexity axiom focuses attention
on the worst outcome generated by each action. The DM seems to be extremely pes-
simistic. However, once IIA is relaxed, the outcome is less extreme despite Symmetry
and ambiguity aversion. The minimax regret criterion satises Symmetry, ambiguity
aversion, Independence and the following weaker version of IIA. Preferences are now
allowed to depend on the set of actions available, a property called menu dependence.
In order to achieve a form of consistent behavior across di¤erent sets or menus, the
Independence to Never Best Alternatives (INA) axiom is postulated. Actions may be
added without changing preferences as long as they do not change the outcome of an
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omniscient decision maker who knows which state will occur. In other words, the best
outcome in each state cannot be changed. This invariance to situations that do not
a¤ect the well being of such an omniscient decision maker turns the focus to the best
outcome in each state and thus leads to concern for regret.
B The EVS Questionnaire
In Subsection 4.1 we have illustrated the questions selected from the EVS questionnaire
and the associated answer options. In the following we report the exact way in which
they appear in the questionnaire.
Questions C013, C016, C012 are structurally very similar. They all start with the
following statement: Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are impor-
tant. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important
in a job. Each question is then associated to a specic aspect which may or may not
be mentioned. In particular C013 is associated to job security, C016 to opportunity
to use initiative, and C012 to not too much pressure. In the questionnaire there are
fteen more questions structured in this way, each specifying a di¤erent aspect. The
answer options are 0; 1 respectively standing for not mention, mention. There is no
limit in the number of aspects that can be mentioned out of the eighteen presented.
Question D026 asks the respondent how he/she feels about the following statement:
A marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy. The possible
answers are 1; 2; 3; 4; 5, standing respectively for agree strongly, agree, neither agree
or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. We combine answers 1; 2 and answers 3; 4; 5,
label them respectively with agreeand not agreeso as to have two answer options
only. Answer 3 is allocated to not agreeto obtain groups of roughly equal size.
Finally question A029 belongs to a group of seventeen questions all starting as
follows: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home.
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?. Each of the seventeen
questions mentions a di¤erent quality. The one corresponding to question A029 is
independence. The answer options are 0; 1 respectively standing for not mentioned,
important. The respondent cannot answer importantto more than ve questions.
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country original n relevant n population adjusted n
Austria 1,522 1,467 8.0 112
Belgium 1,912 1,669 10.2 144
Denmark 1,023 941 5.3 75
Finland 1,038 1,010 5.2 73
France 1,615 1,582 58.5 823
Germany 2,036 1,784 82.0 1,154
Greece 1,142 1,109 10.9 153
Ireland 1,012 966 3.7 53
Italy 2,000 1,895 56.9 800
Luxembourg 1,211 745 0.4 6
Netherlands 1,003 974 15.8 222
Portugal 1,000 961 10.2 143
Spain 1,200 1,131 39.8 560
Sweden 1,015 962 8.9 125
United Kingdom 2,000 1,698 58.6 824
Europe 20,729 18,894 312.0 5,264
Table 13: The number of individuals in the original sample, the number of individu-
als after dropping non-citizens and incomplete observations, the population sizes (in
millions) and the number of observations adjusted for the country size.
C Data Treatment
The data comes from the fourth wave of the European Values Survey. Our country
choice is based on the member states of the European Union in this period. In all
countries the survey took place in 1999, except for Finland where it was held in 2000.
The total sample consists of fteen countries and 20,729 individuals (see Table
13). Within a country individuals are stratied according to geographic population
density. The documentation of the EVS provides more information about the sampling
procedures and non-response. See European Values Survey (n.d.).
To get a clearer image of country specic behavior, we drop all individuals who are
not citizens of the country they live in. This eliminates 6.2% of the observations from
the whole sample, and apart from Luxembourg (37.3%), the United Kingdom (12.5%),
Belgium (11.2%) and Denmark (5.3%), less than 5% of the observations at the country
33
level.
For our 5 questions the answer options have been reported in Appendix B. There
exist however four additional possibilities for each of the questions, namely:  4 = not
asked in the survey;  3 = not applicable;  2 = no answer6;  1 = dont know. We
have dropped all these data out of our sample. This eliminates 2.7% of the observations
in the whole sample, and apart from Germany (9.6%) less than 5% of the observations
at the country level.
Due to historical reasons, individuals living in one of the states of former East
Germany are overrepresented in the sample. We use data from the Statistisches Bun-
desamt Deutschland (n.d.) to construct the population proportion of the combined
formerly East German states in 1999. Individuals of these states are then weighted
so that their sample proportion equals their population proportion. This reduces the
e¤ective number of observations for Germany to 1,154.
In the pooled estimations we weigh individuals so that the e¤ective sample size of
a country is proportional to its population size in 1999 (data obtained from Eurostat,
n.d.). Germany is the country with the lowest ratio observations per inhabitant. The
adjusted number of observations for the other countries follows from multiplying the
country populations by this ratio. The e¤ective number of observations when correcting
for population size equals 5,264 (rounded).
In order to have a better representation of the country population, we weigh the
individuals of a country such that the fraction females in the sample equals the pop-
ulation fraction in 1999 (data obtained from Eurostat). For Germany this weighting
is performed for former East and West Germany individually (data obtained from
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland).
D Test Statistics
For a specic country, the standard Pearson and likelihood ratio statistic measure
the di¤erence between the theoretical predictions and the data. Our Pearson and
likelihood ratio statistics are the sum of these country specic statistics. Our statistics
thus measure the aggregate di¤erence between the theoretical predictions and the data
for each country. In our case, each of the ve questions has 2 relevant answers. The
6No answerdoes not mean that the respondent does not know but that she explicitly prefers not
to answer the question.
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total number of cells thus equals 15  25 = 480. Note that we have 5,264 e¤ective
observations, which is enough for the statistic to be informative.
The degrees of freedom are the number of independent cells for Europe, 25 1 = 31,
minus the k  1 independent type specic proportions, minus the k 5 (2  1) = 5k
independent answer probabilities plus the number of binding constraints.
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of frequencies of Bayesian and maximin utility type behaviors.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of frequencies of minimax regret and unconstrained type be-
haviors (labels belonging to the points within the box are contained in the box on the
upper right).
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